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European Market Integration and the Political Economy of Corporate 
Adjustment: OTE and Telecom Italia, 1949-2009 
 
Abstract: Despite the common challenges posed by European market integration and 
liberalisation, the behaviour of telecommunications operators across Europe suggests 
a variety of modes of adjustment and paths to privatisation. The article examines the 
puzzle of divergent responses to liberalisation by OTE and Telecom Italia, casting 
light on their distinct paths to privatisation and internationalisation. The cases are 
considered in the context of the Varieties of Capitalism frame, which challenges the 
perspective that global market integration will lead to convergence in strategies and 
structures. Thus, the article suggests that the observed differences are largely 
explained by the domestic actors’ preferences, and to a much lesser extent attributed 
to the globalizing forces of technological change and competition. 
 
Keywords: European Union; Liberalisation; Telecommunications; Privatisation; 
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Introduction 
 
The telecommunications sector in Europe is an excellent test case for arguments 
pertaining to convergence and divergence in comparative capitalism. The sector 
exemplifies the simultaneous operation of several of the relevant processes that are 
associated with globalization. Telecommunications operators across the globe 
transformed due to rapid technological change and this drove reform in the sector.1 
The European Union’s (EU) plan for liberalisation facilitated the exposure of 
incumbent operators to intense global competition.2 Although the EU did not require 
privatisation, several governments sought to privatize the incumbents to prepare the 
firms for the new business environment.3 Despite the convergent pressures coming 
from global technological change and EU-wide liberalisation, the privatisation paths 
and the incumbents’ internationalisation strategies across Europe differed sharply.4 
This divergence presents us with an intriguing empirical puzzle that deserves further 
analysis and explanation. 
 
The case studies presented here cast some light on this puzzle. The liberalisation 
appeared as a common stimulus for both the Greek and the Italian incumbent 
operators, however, there were also substantial differences in the mode of the 
privatisation process, and the enterprises’ internationalisation strategies. The cases of 
OTE and Telecom Italia are not only relevant to examine the broader question of 
enterprises’ reactions to European integration5; they are also likely to fill a gap in the 
underdeveloped literature of firm-level studies from ‘peripheral’ national contexts 6. 
The research design is comparative and historical 7 and traces the process of change in 
 
 
 
the regulation, ownership and strategy of those enterprises. This responds to calls for 
research that ‘embraces more than one company/country simultaneously’.8 
 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next section presents an overview of 
the convergence/divergence debate in the Varieties of Capitalism framework, and pins 
down its relevance by showing how the two country-contexts and company-cases fit 
into this frame. The following section elaborates on the particular operation of 
‘convergence pressures’ in the European telecoms industry due to global 
technological change and EU regulatory change. Next, the focus shifts towards 
examining the historical trajectories of change in the two enterprises: OTE and 
Telecom Italia. The historical background matters, because it allows us to identify 
path dependencies and explain the enterprises’ behaviour and reactions to 
liberalisation through privatisation and internationalisation. The case studies suggest 
the plausibility of the argument, that the observed differences in privatisation paths 
and internationalisation strategies are attributed to the choices of domestic political-
economic actors. 
 
Varieties of Capitalism: Between Convergence and Divergence 
 
The global market integration, fuelled by technological change and intensification of 
competition was widely considered as the unstoppable force that could lead to 
convergence in institutional structures9 and enterprise strategies10. The nationally 
specific institutional arrangements were expected to converge to the Liberal or Anglo-
Saxon model of capitalism, usually exemplified either by the United Kingdom or the 
 
 
 
United States.11 The distinct features of this model entail the wide application of 
liberal principles in the organisation of markets coupled with a reduced role of the 
state, in terms of ownership and regulation. Simultaneously, multinational companies 
were expected to be the main carriers of change, by adopting similar ‘best practices’ 
across institutional contexts via their internationalisation strategies.12 
 
Despite on-going pressures from globalisation and liberalisation, the comparative 
capitalism literature suggested that cross-national institutional diversity persists.13 
This literature brought back a basic insight from Karl Polanyi that all markets are 
themselves socially and culturally embedded. 14  More particularly, the literature 
emphasised that trajectories of change are ‘historically rooted’.15 It also emphasised 
the role of collective actors operating within the ‘beneficial constraints’ 16 of the 
domestic model of capitalism, largely held responsible for path-dependent responses 
to globalization 17. Thus, these insights qualified the all-powerful role of structural 
shifts, including marketization and technological change. Instead, the literature 
claimed that the interplay between agents and capitalist models mediates common 
pressures, and shapes institutional structures and business strategies.18 
 
The paper employs the Varieties of Capitalism frame as a heuristic device to shed 
light on the differences and commonalities in the two cases. This frame is quite 
suitable to make sense of the institutional context in Greece and Italy. Both countries 
are generally held to belong to the same model of capitalism dubbed either as ‘State-
enhanced capitalism’ 19; ‘Mixed market economies’ 20 or ‘Mediterranean capitalism’ 
21. This model differs from both Liberal Market economies (e.g. the UK) and 
 
 
 
Coordinated Market economies (e.g. Germany). 22  The corporate actors in state 
capitalism have an incentive to invest in ‘political power’ because clientelistic 
relationships are pervasive.23 Firms generally follow low-cost strategies, operating in 
regulated product markets with low competition; access to funding is bank-based; 
industry-bank relations are relatively stable, while financial markets are 
underdeveloped.24 Additionally, the role of the state is historically important and 
intervenes in all spheres of economic activity25, whereas it regularly acts as a 
‘compensator of first resort’, while the process of adjustment to globalization is 
dependent on the gate-keeping role of the state 26. 
 
The framework suggests that the historical trajectory matters not only for the 
evolution of the national institutional context, but also for the firms that operate in 
those contexts. As we shall see in the case studies, those general characteristics 
broadly fit with the historical background of Telecom Italia and OTE. Both 
companies were state-owned, and operated as monopolies, thus, facing no 
competition in their domestic markets. Additionally, state intervention has been 
significant in shaping their business strategy in the past. The enterprises’ response to 
the external shock of liberalisation was path-dependent, circumscribed into domestic 
actors’ preferences (namely, government and managers). Before examining these 
divergent responses in more detail, the next section turns to the convergence pressures 
stemming from the global technological change and EU-wide liberalisation. 
 
Convergence in EU Telecoms: Technological Change and Liberalisation 
 
 
 
 
The rate of technological change accelerated over the 1980s and 1990s with the 
advent of microprocessors. This allowed the application of computing to 
telecommunications services, such as the digitisation of switching and transmission of 
calls. The new methods of transmission through optical fibre cables and satellites 
enabled the provision of quicker and cheaper fixed telephony as well as the provision 
of new value-added services.27 Additionally, rapid technological change was observed 
in the mobile telephony networks with a gradual upgrading from analogical signal 
(1G), to GSM or DCS (2G) in the 1990s, and finally to 3G in the 2000s. In both fixed 
telephony and mobile telephony segments the new technologies afforded higher 
capacities, necessary to accommodate an increasing demand for services.28 In parallel, 
the 1990s marked the expansion of the Internet to constantly higher speeds and 
bandwidths (from PSTN to ISDN and finally xDSL technologies). This in turn 
allowed the parallel transmission of voice and data over broadband, and the trend 
towards industry convergence. 29  These technological advancements led to the 
‘combined business model’ and specifically, the bundling of telephony with 
broadband services (double-play) and also cable TV (triple-play).30 
 
Technological change was considered as one of the primary factors that drove 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, in addition to the shift in ideologies 
and the tighter budgetary constraints.31 More specifically, the ideological shifts since 
the 1980s altered the traditional conception that telecommunications were a natural 
monopoly. 32  The first mover was the United States, with a speedily reformed 
telecommunications market. The US Federal government abolished AT&T’s 
monopoly and this paved the way for new entrants such as Sprint. Similarly, the 
 
 
 
monopoly of British Telecom in Britain ended in 1984, after the Conservative 
government gave to Mercury a licence as a public operator, creating a duopoly.33 The 
reforms in the US and Britain unleashed a global dynamic of international ‘regulatory 
competition’ and ‘competitive emulation’ and the Europeans decided that 
liberalisation was unavoidable if they were to retain their international 
competitiveness.34 
 
After overcoming disagreements between member-states in the late 1980s, the 
European Commission accelerated the implementation of its liberalisation agenda 
particularly targeted to dissolving national telecom monopolies. 35  A series of 
Commission Directives required the abolition of monopolies by January 1st 1998. 
The opening up of the European telecom market was gradual, first targeting specific 
segments, such as satellite communications and mobile telephony, until the launch of 
a full-scale liberalisation in all telecommunications services.36 Overall, the European 
telecoms sector was widely considered as the ‘success story’ of the EU liberalisation 
programme. The relaxation of regulation in a wide range of ‘network services’ sectors 
in Greece and Italy is partly reflected on the OECD indicator 37 that measures product 
market regulation of non-manufacturing industries, including telecoms (see Figure 1). 
 
< < < Insert Figure 1 Here > > > 
 
As a consequence of the European liberalisation programme, dozens of incumbent 
telecom operators rapidly transformed into world class multinational corporations.38 
The following sections delve deeper into the commonalities and differences between 
 
 
 
OTE and Telecom Italia by examining their responses to liberalisation and their paths 
towards privatisation and internationalisation. 
 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), 1949-2009 
 
Historical Background 
The internationalisation of telecommunications operators is known to have historical 
precedents particularly before the interwar period.39 In Greece, German and British 
subsidiaries offered telephony and telegraphy services up until the late 1940s. AETE 
(Greek Telephone Company), which was a Siemens subsidiary, provided telephony 
services, whereas Eastern Telegraph, which was a subsidiary of the Cable & Wireless, 
offered international telegraphy services.40 After the end of the Second World War, 
the national communications infrastructure was largely destroyed, and the costs of 
repairs were borne out by the US Marshall Plan funds. In 1949, the Greek government 
decided to nationalise the above enterprises, merging them into a single one (OTE) 
and granting exclusive rights in the provision of telephony and telegraphy.41 
 
In the following decades, the performance of OTE under public ownership was 
ambivalent. The expansion of productive capacity was impressive, closely following 
developments in technological change. It started with a very low telephone density, 
but managed to attain very high rates; and by the end of the 1950s, there were 2.88 
telephone connections per 100 inhabitants, which was the 10th highest density rate in 
Europe at the time.42 Additionally, OTE was among the first European operators to 
automate the intercity telephone calls in the 1960s, and was the sixth in Europe to 
 
 
 
launch an antenna of satellite communications in 1970. The above achievements were 
due to a rapid expansion of its network and substantial infrastructure investments 
stemming from government funding. Although government funding was favourable 
on investments for the expansion and upgrading of the network, there were several 
inefficiencies that persisted. In the 1990s successive governments used those exact 
inefficiencies to make OTE’s privatisation more palatable. 
 
OTE never fully met customer demand and customer service quality deteriorated as 
demand for new telephone connections increased over time.43 By the end of the 
1980s, the waiting time for a new telephone line installation was about 5.5 years.44 
The management of the organisation suffered from excessive government interference 
and this mirrored the prevalence of clientelistic practices and the statist character of 
the Greek model of capitalism. For instance, on human resources, the personnel 
selection and recruitment processes were, more often than not, based on political 
affiliation criteria, serving the electoral interests of successive centre-right and 
socialist governments. 45  This led to overstaffing in OTE reaching a peak of 
employment at about 30,000 employees in 1986. On the side of operations 
management, special government committees in the Ministry of Telecommunications 
had to approve equipment procurement, adding layers of bureaucracy and 
exacerbating delays in the supply of equipment. Finally, on pricing strategy, the 
Ministry of Economy co-determined the tariffs jointly with management, serving the 
main aim to keep the costs for consumers as low as possible.46 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the ideological shifts at the European level 
required the liberalisation of telecom markets. The European Commission’s plans to 
open up the telecommunications sectors across Europe prompted the specification of a 
five-year development plan (1989-1993) for OTE. To assist the opening up of the 
sector, the European Commission, with the agreement of the Greek government, 
requested from the UK-based management consultancy, Coopers Lybrand & Deloitte, 
to conduct a study on the reform of the Greek telecommunications market.47 The 
overall aim of the final plan was to upgrade the existing infrastructure and improve 
the quality of service by increasing the telephone density; reducing the waiting lists 
and waiting times; and increasing the digitisation of the network.48 This EU impetus 
was bound to radically transform the Greek telecoms sector. 
 
Liberalisation 
The liberalisation of the sector started with the separation of telecoms’ operation and 
regulation. In 1992, the centre-right government, under Prime Minister Konstantinos 
Mitsotakis, passed Law 2075/1992 to establish the first independent regulator, the 
National Telecommunications Commission. Its actual operation delayed until the 
summer of 1995, and even then, the regulatory authority was only focused on the 
mobile telephony segment of the market. The new socialist government, under Prime 
Minister Kostas Simitis, enacted Law 2668/1998 with the aim to reorganise the postal 
services sector and renamed the National Telecommunications Commission (EET) 
into the National Telecommunications and Post Commission (henceforth: EETT). A 
stream of European Union Directives required the revision of the legal framework to 
 
 
 
achieve compliance. Most notably, Law 2867/2000 strengthened the supervisory, 
auditing and regulatory powers of EETT. 
 
The intensification of competition in OTE’s market appeared with a notable delay. 
Although most of the EU member states opened up their telecommunications’ 
markets by 1st January 1998, the Greek government managed to negotiate with the 
European Commission a three-year extension, so that full liberalisation would take 
place in 2001.49  As in other cases, this slow liberalisation aimed at giving breathing 
time to the ‘national champion’ to adjust to the changing circumstances.50 But in the 
case of OTE, this delay also meant ‘buying time’ for the government to appease the 
opposition coming from within the party and the socialist trade unions. OTE needed 
the time to prepare for an environment with high competitive pressures, while the 
government bought time to slowly set up the framework and make the privatisation 
more acceptable. 
 
Since 2001, the independent regulatory authority (EETT) assumed a more active role; 
it ensured that OTE did not take advantage of its dominant position. The new entrants 
either developed their own network infrastructures or offered services by leasing 
OTE’s network.51 OTE’s first competitor was Tellas, which a joint venture between 
the Greek Public Power Corporation (DEH) and the Italian WIND. Tellas was able to 
take advantage of the electricity network infrastructure to offer fixed telephony 
services. Additionally, two major Internet service providers, Forthnet and Hellas On 
Line, took advantage of their network infrastructure to offer fixed telephony services. 
On the other hand, some of the new entrants included several start-up companies (e.g. 
 
 
 
Lannet, Telepassport, Teledome, Altec Telecoms, and Vivodi), which offered services 
using the ‘last mile’ of OTE’s network. Nevertheless, few of them managed to survive 
the intensity of competition, and by the late 2000s most of them were either targets of 
acquisitions by larger players or were forced to shut down.52 
 
More generally, the regulatory impact of EETT afforded the new players to erode 
OTE’s monopoly position. As part of its policy to inject competition in the market, 
EETT took a number of measures, for example, introducing number portability to 
allow easy switching between providers. Additionally, the regulatory frame became 
stricter, when EETT made a significant reduction in OTE’s wholesale charges and 
applied a price cap on OTE’s retail tariffs. This led to a move towards cost-reflective 
pricing with a reduction in tariffs for international calls and increases in tariffs for 
local calls.53 From EETT’s standpoint, the policy sought to prevent OTE from 
applying price squeeze upon its competitors.54 As a result, OTE suffered a steady 
decline in its market share (Figure 2). 
 
< < < Insert Figure 2 Here > > > 
 
Privatisation 
The first attempt to privatise OTE took place in 1992. The centre-right government, 
under Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, favoured a privatisation method that 
entailed a mix of asset sale and share issuing. The plan was to sell about 35% of OTE 
to a ‘strategic investor’ via auction; 10% to the public via share issuing; and another 
4% was earmarked for OTE employees. Following a call for tenders, several global 
 
 
 
players expressed interest, including the Japanese NTT, the Spanish Telefónica, and 
France Telecom.55  Despite the interest, the plan to privatise OTE backfired on the 
government, as it met fierce resistance not only from the socialist opposition and the 
socialist trade union, but also from within members of the centre-right party. The row 
over OTE’s privatisation proved to be a political suicide; the Mitsotakis government 
lost the slim parliamentary majority and collapsed in 1993. 
 
Following the October 1993 elections, the new socialist government, under Prime 
Minister Andreas Papandreou, abandoned the plans for finding a ‘strategic investor’ 
for OTE. Yet the government did not fully forsake the plans for privatisation. Fiscal 
consolidation for the entry to the Economic and Monetary Union was considered as 
completely unattainable without -at least partial- privatisations.56 OTE was considered 
as one of the gems in the crown of public sector enterprises, and certainly, on the top 
of the privatisation list. The socialists followed a much different approach for the 
privatisation of OTE than the earlier centre-right government. Instead of asset-sale 
privatisation (i.e. transferring a block of shares to a strategic investor) they pursued a 
more ‘gradualist’ approach of shares issuing. Indeed, the first public offering of OTE 
shares (6%) took place in 1996 and the socialist government followed this approach 
up until 2004. This brought the state ownership of OTE from 100% in 1995 down to 
33.4% in 2004.57 This step-by-step privatisation reflected the politically contested 
process of privatisations, and contrasts sharply with the Italian case, whereby 
Telecom Italia was privatized very quickly. The socialists managed to appease the 
tensions that the OTE sell-out provoked within the party and the trade unions in two 
ways. First, the state remained the ‘controlling interest’ and retained the ‘golden 
 
 
 
share’ via Law 2843/2000, which stipulated that state ownership should be no less 
than 33.4%. Second, OTE was protected by hostile takeovers via Law 2257/1994, 
which imposed a 5% cap on voting rights for private investors, even if they held more 
than 5% of OTE shares 
 
In 2004 the government changed to the centre-right, under Prime Minister Costas 
Caramanlis.  The government’s stake increased temporarily to 48.6%, because it 
exercised an option to convert a bond into shares, and this was followed by public 
offering of OTE shares (10%), bringing state ownership again down to 38.7%. 58 The 
government’s tight control over the company and the cap on minority shareholders’ 
voting rights, made the acquisition of OTE by a strategic investor relatively 
unattractive. For this reason, the government enacted Law 3522/2006 in December 
2006 abolishing the 5% cap on voting rights and the provision over a minimum level 
of state ownership, to pave the way for privatisation. 59  In January 2007 the 
government hired a group of international consultants, including UBS and Credit 
Suisse First Boston, to search for strategic investors for OTE. Despite the institutional 
changes, the search did not yield any results60, and the government sold another 
10.7% stake to institutional investors, bringing state ownership down to 28% in June 
2007. In August 2007 the government also amended Law 2190/1920 on corporate 
governance of Public Limited Companies (Société Anonyme) by strengthening the 
rights of minority shareholders. In particular, the new Law 3604/2007 reduced the 
required percentage of shares for ‘large’ minority shareholders from 33% to 20% and 
granted them enhanced rights pertaining to information, auditing, and postponing or 
vetoing decisions of the Shareholders’ Meetings.61 
 
 
 
 
This sequence of institutional changes had unintended consequences, unforeseen by 
the government. The combination of these reforms gave increased powers to private 
investors holding 20% of OTE, and in conjunction with a high exposure of OTE 
shares in the stock market, increased OTE’s vulnerability to a hostile takeover. Marfin 
Investment Group (MIG), a holdings company with investments in several sectors, 
seized this opportunity. MIG started silently buying out OTE shares from the stock 
market, reaching gradually a 19.9% of OTE.  
 
The revelation of this slow acquisition led to a public outcry for the government, and 
media blamed the government for ‘being caught while sleeping’.62 MIG requested a 
seat in the board of directors and expressed an interest in taking over full control of 
OTE. It assured OTE employees and the government that its intention was to make a 
long-term investment and develop OTE as a ‘national champion’, rather than liquidate 
it or sell off some parts.63 Still, the government did not favour such an acquisition. 
The right-wing government considered Marfin Investment Group’s interest as highly 
opportunistic.64 
 
To avoid this hostile takeover, the Minister of Economy, George Alogoskoufis, 
passed quickly in December 2007 a law that set an upper 20% limit for the 
participation of individual investors in companies of ‘strategic importance’ such as 
OTE.65 It was clear that this law was against European competition rules, and could 
be challenged by the European Commission. In practice, this bought some time for 
the government to find a ‘white knight’ and achieve a friendly takeover, and 
 
 
 
specifically Deutsche Telekom (DT). Following consultations, the three parties (the 
government, DT, and MIG) reached a deal. The deal provided that DT would buy 
MIG’s 20% stake plus another 3% stake from the government and 2% from the stock 
market. DT bought MIG’s 20% stake at 26 Euros per share, which entailed a 36% 
premium above the market price of 19.14 Euros, which was quoted on the stock 
exchange at the time.66 By November 2008, DT and the Greek state each held 25% of 
the company. DT agreed in this deal under the specific condition that it would 
eventually purchase an additional 5% from the government, which would give full 
control of OTE and a total of 30% ownership. In July 2009 Deutsche Telekom 
increased the stake to 30% and state ownership reduced to 20%. This made DT the 
largest shareholder with rights to appoint the Chief Executive and to have a majority 
of seats on the company’s Board.67 DT was also granted with a ‘right of first refusal’, 
that is, the contractual right to acquire the remaining state shares before they can be 
offered to anyone else. DT exercised this right and by the end of March 2012 
Deutsche Telekom held 40% of OTE. The Greek state’s ownership fell to 10%, 
retaining some ‘golden share’ veto rights in areas such as national security. 
  
Internationalisation 
OTE’s revenues from international sales stood at 0.5% of total sales in 1999, but 
increased rapidly to the level of 26% by 2007.68 Although the level of OTE’s 
internationalisation was similar to the levels of Telecom Italia, the path was 
substantially different. The internationalisation strategy of OTE focused on becoming 
one of the major regional players. As OTE came in rather late in the liberalisation 
phase, it sought to take advantage of opportunities to expand its market in the 
 
 
 
neighbouring countries of South-eastern Europe (the Balkans). This market-seeking 
strategy was a critical part of the overall business strategy of OTE in the post 
liberalisation era. It is reflected on the statement by the Managing Director of OTE, 
Lefteris Antonacopoulos, who insisted that the expected strong performance of OTE 
was based on OTE’s entry into ‘South-Eastern Europe, a telecommunication market 
of 60 million customers’ that provided ‘significant prospects for the development of 
its customer base’.69 This suggests the importance of managers’ role in engaging in 
the internationalisation strategy that will help to appease shareholders.70 As the main 
shareholder of OTE was the state, the strategic focus on the wider region was thought 
to maintain Greece as a force of stability that promotes regional economic 
development, while at the same time building a ‘national champion’. The 
internationalisation process appears to have followed loosely the so-called ‘Uppsala 
model’ that emphasizes the role of geographical proximity, incremental decision-
making, and learning.71 As the Greek managers were more familiar with the political 
and economic context of the neighbouring countries, the expansion of operations in 
the immediate region was preferable as a location choice. 
 
Indeed, by 2002, OTE expanded its operations to the emerging markets of South-
Eastern Europe either directly, setting-up subsidiaries, or indirectly, via acquisitions. 
This expansion was either in the mobile or fixed telephony segments. OTE’s 
internationalisation strategy included the following countries (companies): Albania 
(Cosmo-holding), Bulgaria (Globul), Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia 
(Cosmofon), Romania (Cosmorom, Romtelecom), Serbia (Telekom Srbija), and 
Armenia (Armentel).72 This expansive strategy enhanced the position of OTE as a 
 
 
 
major player in the region and made it attractive for the Deutsche Telekom 
acquisition. As we shall see below it proved to be much more cautious than Telecom 
Italia’s strategy. By the end of 2009 the Group’s maintained a balanced presence in 
the Balkans, divesting only from Armenia and FYROM.73 
 
Telecom Italia (TI) 1960-2009 
 
Historical Background 
The different concession agreements that were granted to private telephone operators 
in the early 20th century segmented the Italian telecommunications across different 
regions. In the 1960s the concession agreements expired, and the telecoms branch 
(IRI-STET) of the state-owned IRI holding company (Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale) purchased shares of the regional operators. Thus, the government created 
a public monopoly under the name of SIP (Società Italiana per l'Esercizio 
Telefonico). 74  Nevertheless, the nationalised company retained a divided 
organisational structure and the national territory was divided into the five zones in 
which the previous five regional companies operated. This structure contributed to the 
persistence of inefficiencies, for example, bureaucratic relationships within and across 
management levels; duplicated tasks and responsibilities; and wasteful human 
resource practices.75 These organisational inefficiencies persisted, since there were 
still different companies in charge of different parts of the communications 
infrastructure leading to an excessive institutional fragmentation.76 Although SIP was 
mainly responsible for the provision of telecoms services to households and 
businesses, Telespazio was responsible for satellite communications, SIRM for 
 
 
 
maritime communications, Iritel for public telephone services, Italcable handled 
international calls, and ASST dealt with long-distance (intercity) calls.77 Unlike other 
telecommunications operators, the nationalisation in Italy did not lead to a unification 
of the system’s subsets. 
 
In the early 1980s, two initiatives stood out as responses to the challenge of persisting 
inefficiencies. The first was related to intra-firm reorganisation, whereas the second 
was oriented to the restructuring of the whole industry. Intra-firm reorganisation in 
SIP involved inter alia: abolition of old geographical divisions that corresponded to 
different entrepreneurial and technical cultures; changes in work organisation away 
from bureaucratic and repetitive jobs towards enlarged job tasks; annualised working 
hours; and incentive pay systems for sales staff.78 
 
Additionally, the coalition government under Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, 
formed by the Christian Democrats, the Socialist Party and three minor coalition 
partners, attempted the restructuring of the whole sector in the early 1980s. To this 
end, it established an expert commission directed by Franco Morganti, an Olivetti 
engineer and consultant, to develop recommendations for action. 79  The 
recommendations of the Committee included the complete liberalisation of the 
terminal market as well as new telematic services, but –unlike developments in 
Britain at the time– the experts defended the preservation of the public monopoly in 
the fixed telephony network. The Committee aimed at ending the fragmentation in the 
industry, and proposed the consolidation of the various telecoms organisations (SIP, 
Telespazio, Italcable, SIRM, Iritel described above) and integrating them into a single 
 
 
 
public monopoly, labelled as ‘monopolio intelligente’.80 Notwithstanding, a series of 
upheavals in Italian politics did not allow the implementation of any of these 
proposals. 
 
Liberalisation 
The inertia persisted until 1987, when the government established a five-year plan 
(Piano Europa) in order to boost competitiveness in the sector and reduce the 
technological gap with other European nations. 81  In addition to technological 
developments abroad, the completion of the Single European Market in 1992 was a 
recurrent theme that the governments and managers used to justify the urgent need for 
institutional reform.82 The Piano Europa was consistent with earlier proposals of the 
Morganti Committee, suggesting the integration of the traditionally fragmented 
system into a ‘super-SIP’ (or ‘super-STET’). The consolidation was thought to be 
important for two reasons: first, it would allow the privatisation of the company in the 
near future; and second, it would establish a powerful Italian telecoms group, able to 
compete with other ‘national champions’ such as British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom 
and France Telecom.83 In 1992 a new law reorganised SIP through the creation of 
‘STET-Telecom Italia’ and a merger between the different companies followed.84 The 
single ‘Telecom Italia’ was finally born in 1994.  
 
Following the transposition of the Directives for the opening up of the mobile and 
fixed-telephony markets, new players appeared. Starting with mobile telephony, the 
Olivetti manufacturing group acquired the first licence and established the Omnitel 
subsidiary in 1995, which began competing with the incumbent’s subsidiary in mobile 
 
 
 
telephony (Telecom Italia Mobile/TIM). The Italian electricity company (ENEL) 
established WIND Telecommunicazioni in the late 1990s, while Blu and the Chinese 
‘3’ entered the market soon after. By the early 2000s competitive pressures in the 
mobile phone segment appeared strong. The first company to compete with Telecom 
Italia in the fixed network was Albacom, which was established in 1995 and was later 
acquired by BT Italia. In 1997, the Olivetti Group established the Infostrada 
subsidiary, which was later acquired by WIND. In 1999, Teletu started offering 
telephony services, until its acquisition by Vodafone in 2010. 
 
AGCOM (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni) was the sector’s 
independent regulator authority established by Law 249 in 1997. AGCOM in Italy 
steered the competition in the market, just as EETT in Greece. It followed a rather 
restrictive tariff policy for Telecom Italia, allowing new entrants to compete for 
services using the ‘last mile’ of the fixed network infrastructure and preventing 
Telecom Italia from ‘abusing’ its dominant position.85 Similarly to OTE, Telecom 
Italia had to engage into a rebalancing of tariffs between local, intercity and 
international calls, so that it complies with the price cap applied by AGCOM.86 
 
Figure 3 presents the rapid decline in the market share of the Telecom Italia from 
100% (monopoly) in late 1990s to 65% in the late 2000s and sketches the picture of 
intensified competition in the Italian market. 
 
< < < Insert Figure 3 Here > > > 
 
 
 
 
Privatisation 
Although the liberalisation was largely guided by the European Commission’s 
agenda, the privatisation of Telecom Italia was on the agenda of successive Italian 
governments. Both centre-right and centre-left parties shared the common goal of 
raising funds so as to reduce the national debt and eventually join the Economic and 
Monetary Union.87 For the privatisation of Telecom Italia, the centre-left coalition, 
under Prime Minister Romano Prodi, favoured a mix of asset-sale and share issuing. 
In particular, the preferred formula entailed a ‘stable core’ of large shareholders 
having an 18% stake, while another 35% was sold via public offering to the stock 
exchange. 88  Indeed, 35 years after the nationalisation of the 1960s, the state 
ownership of Telecom Italia ended on 20 October 1997, but the government retained 
some ‘golden share’ powers. Nonetheless, the shareholders’ core proved to be rather 
weak and unstable, since it owned only a 6.62% stake, and this opened the way to the 
subsequent takeovers. 
 
The first takeover was an initiative led by the Olivetti Group. Although the CEO of 
Telecom Italia at the time, Franco Bernabè, tried to erect defences against the hostile 
takeover, these did not work, partly because the government did not whole-heartedly 
embrace them. The most important one was the search for a ‘white knight’; finding a 
friendly-bidder who would offer a higher bid than the hostile bid led by Olivetti. 
Deutsche Telekom was the main candidate as a friendly-bidder, which was allegedly a 
‘problematic’ white knight for the Italian government, because the German state 
owned a 72% of Deutsche Telekom. The acquisition by DT would have led to a 
 
 
 
foreign renationalisation of Italy’s biggest listed company, and this prospect ‘was too 
much for the Italian government to stomach’.89  
 
Massimo D’Alema, who had become Prime Minister of the centre-left coalition 
government in the meantime, entered into negotiations with the German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. Despite this, the negotiations failed, since Germany was not 
willing to privatise Deutsche Telekom in the near future, and Massimo D’Alema 
eventually favoured the Olivetti solution.90 The government’s preference was that 
Telecom Italia would be better to fall onto Italian hands, rather than the German state. 
Thus, the hostile takeover of Telecom Italia by Olivetti was completed by the end of 
May 1999. 
 
Still, the Olivetti control of Telecom Italia was not bound to last. The second hostile 
takeover was largely a consequence of the first one. The main problem was that 
Olivetti effectively bought a company that was five times larger than it was; and 
achieved this by financing the acquisition via debt.91 Nonetheless, servicing the debt 
was not easy and the performance of Telecom Italia’s stocks remained unimpressive 
in the following two years. An alliance between Pirelli and Benetton seized the 
opportunity and offered a very lucrative bid for the holding company (Bell) that 
controlled Telecom Italia. Marco Tronchetti Provera, CEO of Pirelli, orchestrated the 
hostile takeover and eventually took control of Bell through an elaborate mechanism 
of ‘Chinese boxes’.92 On 28 July 2001 Pirelli and Benetton acquired Bell and gained 
the control of Telecom Italia 93 and Tronchetti Provera became the CEO of Telecom 
Italia up until 2006. Nevertheless, the huge debt that the holding company incurred 
 
 
 
made it vulnerable to yet another takeover. In 2007, a consortium of Italian banks 
together with the Spanish Telefónica, acquired the holding company through which 
Pirelli and Benetton retained control of Telecom Italia. The Prime Minister Romano 
Prodi accepted the deal under the condition that ‘Spanish Telefónica will only be a 
minority shareholder, and the majority of control will remain in Italian hands’.94 
Overall, the government was involved in each occasion, but each hostile takeover had 
different implications for shareholders. In 1999 Olivetti acquired TI by launching a 
tender offer, which benefited all shareholders, whereas the subsequent takeovers took 
place outside of the stock market, by paying a premium only to a small core of 
shareholders.95 
 
Internationalisation 
The internationalisation strategy that Telecom Italia followed initially focused on 
becoming one of the major global players. Telecom Italia sought to take advantage of 
opportunities both in Europe and overseas. In Europe, the opportunities appeared out 
of the EU liberalisation programme with the privatisation of incumbents or opening 
up of national markets to competition. The share of TI’s international sales as a 
percentage of total shares increased from 6% in 1999 to 29% in 2007.96 Apart from 
Europe, Telecom Italia seized opportunities in the emerging markets of Latin 
America, which offered fertile ground for market-seeking investments. Indeed, in 
2000 the CEO of Telecom Italia, Roberto Colannino, outlined the Group’s 
internationalisation strategy as follows: ‘The expansion of international business is a 
key element of our strategic plan. The Group aims to become a global operator in the 
 
 
 
wireline, wireless and Internet sectors, in particular in Latin America, Southern 
Europe and the Mediterranean Basin’.97 
 
In other words, Telecom Italia’s internationalisation strategy was much more 
ambitious in scale than OTE’s, seeking to tap opportunities not only in European 
markets, but also expand to Latin America. The difference in ambition is partly 
explained by the different size of the economies and in which the two companies were 
embedded.98 As TI could rely on a larger domestic market, this could give potentially 
better ground to compete with the major players in the European market such as 
Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom and the Spanish Telefónica. In 2000, Telecom 
Italia held stakes in various European countries such as France (9 Telecom Group, 
Bouygues Decaux Telecom), San Marino (Intelcom RSM), the Netherlands 
(BBNeD), Greece (Stet Hellas), Austria (Telekom Austria Group, Mobilkom Austria), 
Spain (Auna Group), Czech Republic (Radiomobil) and Serbia (Telekom Srbija).99 Its 
overseas operations were strategically focused on Latin America, holding stakes of 
companies in Argentina (Telecom Argentina), Brazil (Brasil Telecom, Maxitel, Tele 
Nordeste Celular, Tele Celular Sul), Bolivia (Entel Bolivia Group), Chile (Entel Chile 
Group), Peru (TIM Peru), Venezuela (Digitel) and Cuba (Etec S.A.).100 
 
Since then, the Group’s strategy shifted towards de-internationalisation. Indeed, the 
2006 Annual Report already stated that ‘We may not achieve the expected return on 
our significant investments and capital expenditures made in our international 
activities due to the competitive environments in these markets’ and highlighted the 
intense competition both in European and Latin American countries.101 By the end of 
 
 
 
2009, TI had sold off stakes in all European operations (except BBNEd in the 
Netherlands) and most Latin American (except for TIM Brasil Group and Telecom 
Argentina). 102  The huge debt that the company had incurred and the growing 
competition meant that Telecom Italia could not keep up with substantial investments 
required to expand capacity abroad. Telecom Italia managers were compelled to 
divest most its international operations and focus instead on less capital-intensive 
segments such as wireless Internet and mobile telephony. TI also increased domestic 
productive capacity, diversified with financial participations in other sectors and paid 
higher dividends to its shareholders.103 Finally, the entry of Spanish Telefónica meant 
that the group’s international strategy had to be realigned so that it does not compete 
with one of its major shareholders, as Telefónica had also substantial stakes in Latin 
America. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The case studies presented here suggested that the convergence pressures from global 
technological change and the European market integration were mediated differently 
in Telecom Italia and OTE. These patterns broadly corroborate other works in the 
literature, which found that the institutional convergence in regulatory frameworks 
and technological change, did not necessarily lead to convergence in business 
strategies and outcomes.104 Yet the cases also suggest the specificity of the statist 
model of capitalism105 in shaping those paths of adjustment. In a nutshell, the factors 
that appear to explain the divergent outcomes include the domestic actors’ interests 
and preferences, and especially governments and managers. 
 
 
 
 
Telecom Italia was privatised through one-off sale, whereas the Greek governments 
followed a gradualist approach, selling chunks of government shares in the stock 
market through public offerings. In both cases, governments retained golden share 
powers, but the revenues from the sales were expected to improve the fiscal 
consolidation process for entry in the Economic and Monetary Union.106 Furthermore, 
the regulatory framework allowed successive hostile takeovers in Italy, however, 
tempered by the preferences of the government. The role of the government was even 
more pronounced in Greece, acting as a gatekeeper and blocking similar attempts for 
hostile takeovers. Despite the liberalisation and privatisation, political intervention 
continued in both sectors. The two governments expressed their divergent preferences 
over the bidder. In Italy, the domestic consortium with Spanish Telefónica was 
preferred over Deutsche Telekom. In Greece, Deutsche Telekom was preferred over 
the MIG consortium.  
 
Both incumbents reacted to liberalisation with internationalisation that reached similar 
levels in international sales, and both governments sought to groom their telecom 
operators as ‘national champions’. Yet the strategies and preferences of managers and 
governments towards foreign acquisitions differed sharply. In Greece, the 
government-appointed managers favoured OTE’s expansion in the neighbouring 
Balkans, which was thought to strengthen the political role of Greece as a force of 
stability in the region. The historical ties and cultural links with South-eastern Europe 
also helped to facilitate such a ‘regional’ internationalisation strategy. By contrast, 
Telecom Italia appeared more ambitious and eager to become a global player with 
 
 
 
operations across Europe (Spain, France, the Netherlands, Austria) and Latin America 
(Brazil, Chile, Argentina). But TI’s strategy soon run out of steam as the political 
instability in Latin America (e.g. Bolivia’s renationalization of Entel) and the fierce 
competition in European markets threated the expansion of domestic productive 
capacity. By contrast, OTE’s strategy proved to be more sustainable and by the end of 
the decade, OTE still held most of its international operations in Bulgaria, Romania, 
Albania, and Serbia. 
 
Overall, domestic actors’ interests and preferences largely explain the divergent paths 
and strategies. Rather than a monolithic trend guided by competition and 
technological change, the governments’ preference over privatisation and the 
managers’ choices over internationalisation strategy shaped the corporate adjustment 
of the two incumbents in the post-liberalisation era. Fligstein and Merand suggested 
that the role of the state is still important in shaping the direction of change in 
contemporary capitalism while ‘constructing markets’.107 There is evidence for this in 
both cases. The influence of the government was either direct, through government 
intervention in critical junctures, or indirect, through changes in the regulatory 
framework regarding hostile takeovers and preference over the favoured bidder. 
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